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Worse than Punishment:
How the Involuntary Commitment of Persons
with Mental Illness Violates the
United States Constitution
by SAMANTHA M. CASPAR* & ARTEM M. JOUKOV**
The most important deprivation of human and constitutional
rights inflicted upon persons said to be mentally ill is involuntary
mental hospitalization . . .
– Dr. Thomas Szasz
Individuals struggling with mental health ailments face many
challenges, sometimes including the loss of liberty. While incarceration in
jail or prison may follow criminal misconduct, this is not the most imposing
threat to liberty faced by persons with mental illness. Instead, they must
cope with the possibility of involuntary commitment to a treatment facility,
a fate that may be worse than criminal incarceration. While it may be
necessary to commit some persons with mental illness that pose a danger,
the current process for determining the appropriateness of involuntary
commitment leaves many unshielded from the unbounded discretion of
judges and doctors. Because the terms of involuntary commitment are often
unrestrained, the ability of those committed to obtain release or
representation is minimal, and diagnosing mental health problems accurately
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proves difficult. This Article posits that both the United States Constitution
and common sense should lead to far greater protections for persons with
mental illness when these persons are faced with the danger of losing their
liberty.

Introduction
Good intentions are often at the heart of laws that activists and
politicians champion as protections for persons with mental illness. These
laws may include the ability to claim insanity as a defense to criminal
accusations,1 the ability to have someone committed to an institution for their
own protection,2 and the ability to deprive someone of their liberty in order
to prevent them from harming others.3 Undoubtedly, these are noble
purposes: it is important to protect individuals with mental illness from
themselves in certain circumstances,4 and it is equally important to permit
them to plead insanity if they commit a crime due to an irresistible impulse
or an inability to contemplate its moral implications.5 The problem is that,
over the years, the use of mental health treatment facilities to limit the
freedom of persons with mental illness has not always benefited such
persons.6
Although many individuals in the United States suffer from mental
illness, indefinite commitment to a mental health treatment facility might not
be the best solution.7 In fact, misdiagnosis, the absence of adequate legal
representation, and the lack of perceived credibility that often accompany
confinement in a mental health treatment facility can result in the involuntary
confinement of too many people for too long.8 Additionally, when compared
to the fate suffered by individuals who commit the very crimes that
confinement is supposed to prevent, people breaking the law often escape
with far lighter sentences of incarceration than those locked in mental health
institutions at the mercy of their doctors.9 When combined with the idea that
a lower standard of proof is required for commitment than conviction,10 it is
not difficult to see an impending catastrophe: confinement in a mental health

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id.
See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. 735.
Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY
(EDGMONT) 30-40 (Oct. 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392176/.
7. Civil Commitment and the Mental Health Care Continuum: Historical Trends and
Principles for Law and Practice, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN.,
https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care.pdf.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Mac McClelland, When ‘Not Guilty’ Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-life-sentence.html.
10. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).

A - CASPAR_ JOUVOK_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2020]

WORSE THAN PUNISHMENT

4/6/2020 10:11 AM

501

institution can be more likely and more severe than the punishment a convict
would receive for similar misconduct.11
Because individuals who are committed to mental health facilities
against their will are often seized as a result of state laws (and often by state
officials), the constitutional implications are grim. While the United States
Supreme Court has approved the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for
determining whether an individual may be constitutionally confined, the
passage of time and an updated understanding of psychology suggests that
courts should revisit the rule.12 This is especially true given the Supreme
Court’s concern regarding the commitment of individuals against their will
absent proof of social harm.13
Because commitment may last far longer than incarceration, few
controls on the discretion of doctors and judges exist (such as maximum
sentence limitations), and psychologists have routinely misdiagnosed
perfectly sane people with serious mental illnesses,14 the Supreme Court
should consider reversing its precedent regarding the standard of proof that
is required to involuntarily commit persons with mental illness.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, states should reconsider their
current due process provisions for individuals they seek to commit to ensure
commitment is used as a last resort when judges and doctors are extremely
confident that commitment is the only viable option to prevent disaster.
Moreover, states should implement a constitutional limitation on the length
of confinement prior to a rehearing.
In addition to elevating the standards of proof for commitment and
increasing limitations on the length of commitments, courts and legislatures
alike should consider extending the right to a jury trial to individuals whose
commitment is in question. While jury trials require significant expense and
effort, they should, theoretically, reduce the probability of a wrongful
commitment.15 Furthermore, requiring the state to prove a case to an
11. Maria Cramer, Worse Than Jail: Addicts Civilly Committed Say DOC Abused Them and
Failed to Treat Them, BOSTON GLOBE (July 13, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.
com/metro/2017/07/13/worse-than-jail-addicts-civilly-committed-say-doc-abused-them-and-faile
d-treat-them/1kzQdRdO6F4QeQuYUiP54J/story.html.
12. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (While the Supreme Court upheld this
standard, it also held in favor of the confined, finding that the State of Florida violated the
individual’s rights by confining him for 15 years. The basis for confinement was a suspicion of
paranoid schizophrenia, despite the fact that the individual was harmless.); see also Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Addington, 441 U.S. at 418.
13. Id.; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992).
14. McClelland, supra note 9; David L. Rosenhan, Being Sane in Insane Places, 179
SCIENCE 250 (1973).
15. Vicki G. Kaufman, The Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury Trial in
Civil Commitment Proceedings?, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 122 (2014); In re Jones, 339 So. 2d
1117, 1119 (Fla. 1976) (“It is well recognized that unsupported allegations of insanity can have a
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empaneled jury would increase public awareness of commitment hearings,
the type of evidence these cases involve, and the questionable nature of some
of this evidence.16 Such a requirement may also prompt greater effort on the
part of counsel representing the government to prove his or her case, greater
scrutiny by the experts involved, greater scrutiny of expert testimony, and
perhaps even greater attentiveness from the judge and appellate courts.17
Then, individuals facing liberty and property deprivations due to mental
illness will receive at least similar protections as those who face such
deprivations due to intentional misconduct.18
Ultimately, this Article will explain that constitutionally mandated
standards should be required to protect individuals who face losing their
liberty due to the perceived threat of future harm. While preventing
individuals from harming themselves or others is an honorable goal, the state
should only be able to intervene when the threat is truly imminent.
Psychologists, judges, and government agents are poor prophets: their ability
to predict some future, undetermined harm is quite limited and can serve as
only a feeble justification for commitment.19 Therefore, the ability to
commit individuals with fewer protections than those offered under criminal
law and use a lower burden of proof without a jury is a powerful weapon of
oppression that no government should wield. Individuals who suffer from
mental health problems can be particularly defenseless against an attack on

detrimental effect upon the personal lives and careers of people. It should not be left to the
discretion of a single judge to make determinations of such allegations.”) (Boyd, J., dissenting);
Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and
Strategic Voting, 94 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 375 (2000).
16. 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 579 n.22 (Wash. 1974).
17. 145 A.L.R. 711; Quesnell, 517 P.2d at 579 n.22; Artem M. Joukov, Who’s the Expert?
Frye and Daubert in Alabama, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 275 (2016) (demonstrating the scrutiny the rules
of evidence require of experts both under federal and Alabama law).
18. Kaufman, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Jones, 339 So. at 1119 (“It is well recognized that unsupported allegations of
insanity can have a detrimental effect upon the personal lives and careers of people. It should not
be left to the discretion of a single judge to make determinations of such allegations.”) (Boyd, J.,
dissenting); Nathaniel Morris, This Secret Experiment Tricked Psychiatrists into Diagnosing Sane
People as Having Schizophrenia, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2018, 7:46 AM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/national/health-science/an-experiment-fooled-psychiatrists-into-treating-sane-peopl
e-as-if-they-were-insane/2017/12/29/c6c9c3ea-d5f7-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html;
Rosenhan, supra note 14; Daniel Distant, John Montin Lawsuit: Sane Man Trapped in Mental
Hospital for 20 Years, CHRISTIAN POST (July 15, 2014), https://www.christianpost.com/trends/
john-montin-lawsuit-sane-man-trapped-in-mental-hospital-for-20-years.html; Ketema Ross, I
Spent Seven Years Locked in a Human Warehouse, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/mental-institution-mental-health-policy-117061_full.html;
McClelland, supra note 9; Logan Albright, Steven Soderbergh’s “Unsane” Exposes the Nightmare
of Involuntary Commitment, FEE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://fee.org/articles/steven-soderberghsunsane-exposes-the-nightmare-of-involunary-commitment.
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their liberty through criminal20 and civil law, and the current laws that permit
potentially indefinite commitment of a person (who may not have even
committed a single crime) reach too far. Leaving these decisions in the hands
of largely unsupervised state agents, who rarely face appeal, is an injustice
to the afflicted, and this essentially unrestrained power must change.
This Article will proceed in Part I by outlining the scope of the mental
health problems across the United States to demonstrate the large number of
people that these commitment procedures potentially impact. In Part II, this
Article will demonstrate the risks and benefits of commitment and the
increasing connection between law and psychology. Part III will outline the
constitutional implications of using involuntary commitment, which
sometimes proves to be a worse punishment than incarceration, to curtail the
liberties of individuals under a lower standard of proof and with fewer
safeguards and limitations on the length and intensity of treatment than those
provided in the criminal justice system. This Article will conclude by
positing that constitutionally mandated bright-line rules may be necessary to
prevent individuals with mental illness from being involuntarily committed.

Part I: Mental Illness
According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, approximately
one in five United States adults experiences a mental illness in any given
year.21 Additionally, one in five American youths ages 13-18 experiences a
mental disorder at some point during their adolescence.22 Roughly 6.3% of
the United States population suffers from a “severe mental illness,” defined
as a long-standing mental illness, typically psychosis, which may cause
prolonged moderate-to-severe disability.23 To put these numbers in
perspective, the number of American adults was approximately 253.2

20. See William N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalization of America, 76 ALA.
LAW. 225 (July 2015) (cited and quoted in Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2008, 2008
n.98 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)). Republished by the Mises Institute (demonstrating how
simple it for some prosecutors to convict an individual not suffering from any mental illnesses);
see also Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar, Wherefore is Fortunato? How the Corpus
Delicti Rule Excludes Reliable Confessions, Helps the Guilty Avoid Responsibility, and Proves
Inconsistent with Basic Evidence Principles, 41 AM. J. TRIAL. ADV. 459, 481, 522 (2018) (noting
the large number of state and federal statutes that may lead to prosecution and discussing the
possibility that confessions to crime may be easier to secure from a mentally ill defendant even
when that defendant did not commit the crime).
21. Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2019),
https://www.nami.org/learn-more/mental-health-by-the-numbers.
22. Id.
23. Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness: Causes and
Consequences, AMA JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Oct. 15, 2013), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.
org/article/deinstitutionalization-people-mental-illness-causes-and-consequences/2013-10.

A - CASPAR_ JOUVOK_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

504

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

4/6/2020 10:11 AM

[Vol. 47:4

million in 2018,24 and nearly 15.9 million of these individuals endured a
severe mental illness.25 Perhaps more astonishing, 46% of Americans will
meet the criteria for a diagnosable mental health condition at some point in
their lives, and half of these individuals will develop a mental health
condition by the age of 14.26 Mental illnesses include anxiety disorders,
trauma-and-stressor-related disorders, eating disorders, mood disorders, and
schizophrenia, among others.27 Many of these illnesses have the potential to
result in criminal misconduct, and hence may increase government scrutiny
of sufferers prior to and subsequently to criminal conduct.
Anxiety disorders include generalized anxiety disorder, panic attacks
and panic disorder, and specific phobia disorders.28 Psychologists define
generalized anxiety disorder as a persistent state of increased anxiety and
apprehension, characterized by heightened worrying, fear, and dread.29
Generalized anxiety disorder affects approximately 3% of the U.S.
population within a one-year period.30 A panic attack is the sudden onset of
a brief period of intense anxiety, fear, or discomfort, accompanied by
physical or emotional symptoms.31 An individual suffering from a panic
attack may have a fear of dying, a fear of going “crazy” or losing control,
depersonalization symptoms, chest pain or discomfort, shortness of breath,
and nausea.32 Panic attacks affect nearly 11% of the population in a single
year and may cause panic disorder, which is the occurrence of repeated panic
attacks, accompanied by fears about future attacks or changes in behavior to
avoid certain situations that may predispose the individual to attacks.33

24. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/US/PST045217.
25. Yohanna, supra note 23.
26. Quick Facts and Statistics About Mental Health, MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA (2019),
https://staging.mhanational.org/mentalhealthfacts.
27. Michael B. First, Overview of Mental Illness, MERCK MANUAL (2017), https://www.
merckmanuals.com/home/mental-health-disorders/overview-of-mental-health-care/overview-ofmental-illness.
28. Id.
29. John W. Barnhill, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), MERCK MANUAL (2018),
https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-relateddisorders/generalized-anxiety-disorder-gad; Michael B. First, Specific Phobia Disorders, MERCK
MANUAL (2019), https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-andstressor-related-disorders/specific-phobic-disorders.
30. Id.
31. John W. Barnhill, Panic Attacks and Panic Disorder, MERCK MANUAL (2018),
https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-relateddisorders/panic-attacks-and-panic-disorder.
32. Understanding Panic Attack – Symptoms, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/anxietypanic/understanding-panic-attack-symptoms (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
33. Barnhill, Panic Attacks and Panic Disorder, supra note 31.
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Overall, anxiety disorders are more common than any other mental health
disorder, affecting approximately 15% of U.S. adults.34
Trauma-and-stressor-related disorders involve exposures to traumatic
or stressful events.35 Trauma-and-stressor-related disorders include acute
stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.36 Acute stress disorder
generally manifests after an individual experiences a traumatic event directly
(such as a serious injury or death threat) or indirectly (such as witnessing
events happening to others), and may cause depression, sleep disturbance,
hypervigilance, or flashbacks.37 Post-traumatic stress disorder is similar to
acute stress disorder, except that acute stress disorder generally begins
immediately after the trauma and lasts from three days to one month,
whereas post-traumatic stress disorder can manifest up to six months after
the trauma and last for longer than one month.38
Mood disorders are emotional disturbances consisting of lengthened
periods of excessive sadness, excessive joyfulness, or both, and are identified
as depressive or bipolar.39 A psychiatrist diagnoses a mood disorder when
sadness or elation is overly intense and persistent, significantly impairs the
individual’s capacity to function, and is accompanied by various other
symptoms.40 In such scenarios, intense sadness is called depression, and
intense elation is called mania.41 Depressive disorders are characterized by
depression, whereas bipolar disorders are designated by varying
combinations of depression and mania.42 Mood disorders are the third most
common cause of hospitalizations for youth and adults ages 18-44 in the
United States.43 Sixteen million—or 6.9%—of adults in the United States
had at least one major depressive episode in the past year.44
Schizophrenia is a “chronic, severe, and debilitating brain disease that
affects approximately one percent of the American population ages eighteen
34.
35.

First, Overview of Mental Illness, supra note 27.
John W. Barnhill, Overview of Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders, MERCK
MANUAL (2018), https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-andstressor-related-disorders/overview-of-trauma-and-stressor-related-disorders.
36. Id.
37. John W. Barnhill, Acute Stress Disorder (ASD), MERCK MANUAL (2018), https://www.
merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/anxiety-and-stressor-related-disorders/acut
e-stress-disorder-asd.
38. Id.
39. William Coryell, Overview of Mood Disorders, MERCK MANUAL (2018), https://www.
merckmanuals.com/professional/psychiatric-disorders/mood-disorders/overview-of-mood-disorders.
40. Id.
41. Bipolar Disorder (Manic Depressive Illness or Manic Depression), HARVARD MED. SCH.
(Mar. 2019), https://www.health.harvard.edu/a_to_z/bipolar-disorder-manic-depressive-illness-ormanic-depression-a-to-z.
42. Coryell, Overview of Mood Disorders, supra note 39.
43. Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21.
44. Id.
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and older in a given year.”45 Schizophrenia may result in deterioration in
thinking, impairments of social function, and disturbances in perception and
may be accompanied by severe symptoms such as hallucinations, thought
and movement disorders, delusions, social withdrawal, and a lack of
motivation.46 Schizophrenics attempt suicide more often than the general
population, with nearly ten percent of schizophrenics dying by suicide.47
Schizophrenia impacts 1.1% of U.S. adults, and bipolar disorder impacts
2.6% of U.S. adults.48
More than half of those who experience a mental illness will exhibit
moderate to severe symptoms.49 Additionally, four of the ten leading causes
of disability among persons ages five and older are mental health disorders.50
Individuals living with serious mental illness face an increased risk of other
chronic medical conditions, and adults in the United States enduring serious
mental illness die nearly 25 years earlier than those without serious mental
illnesses, largely due to treatable medical conditions.51

Part II: Involuntary Commitment
Involuntary commitment, though sometimes required for those who are
particularly dangerous to themselves or others, is hardly the only treatment
option for individuals who suffer from mental illness.52 In fact, evidence
shows that facilities are largely lacking to house all (or even most) of the
individuals enduring mental health problems.53 Thus, important economic
limitations exist to the government simply “locking up” every individual the
government believes to be suffering from mental illness.54 Regardless, a
large number of individuals face the possibility of commitment, which may
give the government a concerning power: to impose commitment on

45. Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, The Implications of Marijuana Legalization
on the Prevalence and Severity of Schizophrenia, 28 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 179 (2018).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21.
49. First, Overview of Mental Illness, supra note 27.
50. Id.
51. Mental Health by the Numbers, supra note 21.
52. Mental Health Treatment & Services, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2019),
https://www.nami.org/learn-more/treatment.
53. Experts questioned by the Treatment Advocacy Center estimate that approximately 50
beds per 100,000 individuals would meet mental health needs for acute and long-term care.
However, many individuals who need residential treatment cannot obtain it, because in some states,
the number of available beds is as low as five beds per 100,000 people. Nationwide, approximately
nine million adults with a mental health condition report having an unmet need. Yohanna, supra
note 23; The State of Mental Health in America, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (2019), http://www.mental
healthamerica.net/issues/state-mental-health-america.
54. Id.
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individuals with mental illness, sometimes seemingly at random, despite the
availability of other, less-imposing treatment options.55
A.

Mental Health Treatment Options

Individuals with mental illness have several treatment options available
(including many options other than commitment to a psychiatric institution),
such as antipsychotic, antidepressant, or antianxiety medication,
rehabilitation, cognitive behavior therapy, and self-help groups.56 Such
treatment is provided in a variety of settings, and the environment and type
of care depend on several factors, including the nature and severity of the
person’s mental illness, the person’s physical health, and the type of
treatment prescribed.57 The primary settings for providing mental illness
treatment include inpatient care and outpatient care.58 Additionally, mental
health care services are occasionally provided via online and
telecommunications technologies.59
Inpatient care is the most intensive level of treatment for individuals
with mental illness, offering around-the-clock care.60 Inpatient care is
commonly tailored to patients suffering from severe mental illnesses, such
as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or substance abuse issues, and who
require near-constant monitoring.61 Inpatient care involves overnight or
longer stays in a psychiatric hospital, a psychiatric unit of a general hospital,
or a residential treatment facility.62 Psychiatric hospitals exclusively treat
mental illnesses and may provide drug and alcohol detoxification and
inpatient drug and alcohol rehabilitation services.63 A psychiatric hospital
may also have separate specialty units for eating disorder treatment and child
and adolescent services.64
Outpatient treatment involves providing services similar to inpatient
care in a more flexible environment.65 Outpatient care permits patients to
attend treatments during the day and return home in the evenings, rather than

55. Mental Health Treatment & Services, supra note 52.
56. Caspar & Joukov, supra note 45, at 179.
57. See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, NORTH TEXAS
HELP, https://www.northtexashelp.com/mental-health-treatment-settings.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2020).
58. See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, ALVARADO PARKWAY
INST. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYS. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.apibhs.com/blog/ 2017/8/18/thedifference-between-inpatient-vs-outpatient-care.
59. See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, supra note 57.
60. See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Types of Mental Health Treatment Settings and Levels of Care, supra note 57.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58.
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staying overnight in a treatment facility.66 Outpatient services are typically
geared toward individuals experiencing mild psychiatric symptoms or those
transitioning from inpatient care.67
i.

Inpatient Commitment

Prior to the 1960s, involuntarily committing an individual to a
psychiatric institution was relatively straightforward, with state laws turning
on a fairly simple determination that the person required care, permitting
confinement to be continued indefinitely without ongoing judicial
oversight.68 However, the deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960s
brought a national trend to reform involuntary commitment laws, shifting the
focus to the individual’s “dangerousness to self or others” as the basis for
civil commitment.69 This trend gained momentum in reaction to a Supreme
Court ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson, which held that a state “cannot
constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.”70
Current involuntary commitment laws permit courts to order persons
with mental illness held in a hospital over their objections for a period of
care and treatment.71 At minimum, these laws are required to address the
constitutional criteria for commitment and the process of commitment.72
Every U.S. state has established civil commitment laws and criteria that
govern when court orders mandate mental health treatment for individuals
suffering from psychiatric symptoms.73 These civil commitment laws
address: the length of a patient’s stay, conditions to the patient’s stay,
whether the state may require a patient to adhere to court-ordered treatments,
and when a patient may be involuntarily re-hospitalized.74
Some states permit involuntary commitment when individuals are
dangerous to themselves or others.75 However, several states now have
66.
67.
68.

The Difference Between Inpatient vs. Outpatient Care, supra note 58.
Id.
Brian Stettin et al., Mental Health Commitment Laws: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR. (2014), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/mental-health-commitm
ent-laws.
69. Id.
70. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
71. John A. Menninger, Involuntary Treatment: Hospitalization and Medications, https://
www.brown.edu/Courses/BI_278/Other/Clerkship/Didactics/Readings/INVOLUNTARY%20TR
EATMENT.pdf.
72. Stettin et al., supra note 68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. For example, Mississippi, North Carolina, and North Dakota have the dangerousness to
self or others standard. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(20).
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broader commitment criteria, which permit the involuntary commitment of
those who are not necessarily deemed “dangerous to themselves or others.”76
Two of these broader commitment standards are the “grave disability”
standard and the “need-for-treatment” standard.77 The “grave disability”
standard allows an individual who becomes unable to provide for the basic
necessities of human survival to be involuntarily committed.78 Alaska
follows the “grave disability” standard, and its law defines “gravely
disabled” as:
[A] condition in which a person as a result of mental illness . . . is
in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of
basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to
render serious accident, illness, or death highly probable if care by
another is not taken.79
The “need-for-treatment” standard is even broader than the “gravely
disabled” standard.80 The justification for this standard is that deterioration
of general health, psychiatric damage, and loss of the ability to function
independently are all unacceptable harms that require involuntary
commitment.81 A need-for-treatment standard generally requires a finding
that an individual’s mental illness prevents him or her from seeking
voluntary help, and if the individual is not treated, he or she will suffer.82
Need-for-treatment laws render involuntary commitment available to an
individual who suffers from a mental illness, even if the individual manages
to meet basic survival needs and exhibits no violent or suicidal tendencies.83
Arizona adheres to the need-for-treatment standard, with involuntary
commitment available if a person is “persistently and acutely disabled,”
which is defined as follows:
‘Persistently or acutely disabled’ means a severe mental disorder
that meets all the following criteria:

76. Stettin et al., supra note 68.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(9)(A) (2019). Utah also has a standard similar to the “grave
disability” standard and provides that an individual may be involuntarily committed if he or she is
in “substantial danger,” which is defined, in part, as the individual is at serious risk of “serious
bodily injury because the individual is incapable of providing the basic necessities of life, including
food, clothing, or shelter.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-602(17).
80. Stettin et al., supra note 68.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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(a) If not treated has a substantial probability of causing the
person to suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental,
emotional or physical harm that significantly impairs judgment,
reason, behavior or capacity to recognize realty.
(b) Substantially impairs the person’s capacity to make an
informed decision regarding treatment and this impairment causes
the person to be incapable of understanding and expressing an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting
treatment and understanding and expressing an understanding of
the alternatives to the particular treatment offered after the
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives are explained to that
person.
(c) Has a reasonable prospect of being treatable.84

Florida’s involuntary commitment law is slightly different.85 Termed
“The Baker Act,” Florida law permits judges, law enforcement officers,
mental health professionals, or doctors to commit individuals suspected of
having a mental illness for up to 72 hours in a mental health treatment facility
if they meet certain criteria.86 For an individual to be involuntarily held,
there must be a reason to believe the person has a mental illness.
Additionally, due to the mental illness, the person must have refused a
voluntary examination or is unable to determine whether such an
examination is necessary and without treatment, the person is likely to suffer
from neglect or harm himself or herself or someone else in the near future.87
An individual may be released or referred to outpatient treatment after 72
hours of involuntary commitment.88 However, if the person is not discharged
within 72 hours, the facility can obtain the individual’s consent to continue
his or her commitment voluntarily, or a facility administrator may file a
petition through the circuit court for continued involuntary commitment.89
84. A.R.S. § 36-501(32) (2019).
85. Dan Sullivan, Five Things to Know About the Baker Act and Why It Didn’t Prevent Car
Attack on New Tampa Bike Family, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.tampa
bay.com/news/courts/Five-things-to-know-about-the-Baker-Act-and-why-it-didn-t-prevent-car-att
ack-on-New-Tampa-bike-family_169491866/.
86. Kate Santich, Florida’s Baker Act – A Revolving Door?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 25,
2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-does-florida-baker-act-work-20170823
-story.html.
87. Sullivan, supra note 85; see also What Happens When You Baker Act Someone? FAMILY
CTR. FOR RECOVERY (Sept. 27, 2017), https://fcfrmd.com/happens-baker-act-someone/.
88. Sullivan, supra note 85.
89. Id.
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If the court finds that a person meets criteria for continued involuntary
commitment, the person can be committed to a mental health facility for up
to six months without an additional hearing or other court proceeding.90
ii. Outpatient Commitment

Involuntary outpatient commitment, also known as assisted outpatient
treatment, occurs when a court orders an individual meeting certain legal
criteria to adhere to an outpatient treatment program as a condition of
remaining in the community.91 Laws for involuntary outpatient commitment
empower judges to order patients to comply with specifically prescribed
treatment.92 All U.S. states but five authorize outpatient commitment:
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee.93 In a
few states, such as Utah, an individual involuntarily committed to an
outpatient program may be required to attend an inpatient program if the
individual does not strictly follow the outpatient treatment regimen.94 For
example, Utah’s involuntary outpatient commitment law provides as
follows:95
If at any time during the specified period it comes to the attention
of the court, either that the patient is not complying with the order,
or that the alternative treatment has not been adequate to meet the
patient’s treatment needs, the court may, after proper hearing:
(1) Consider other alternatives, modify its original order and direct
the patient to undergo another program of alternative treatment for
the remainder of the 90-day period; or
(2) Enter a new order directing that the patient be hospitalized for
the remainder of the 90-day period.
As part of the treatment plan, a court may order involuntary outpatient
commitment that may include participation in therapy, self-help groups, or

90. Sullivan, supra note 85.
91. Outpatient Commitment, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2006), https://www.health.harvard.edu/
newsletter_article/Outpatient_commitment.
92. Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2008), https://www.health.
harvard.edu/newsletter_article/Involuntary_outpatient_commitment.
93. Stettin et al., supra note 68.
94. Id.
95. 18 V.S.A. § 7618(b) (2019).
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medication.96 The outpatient treatment plan may also require supervised
living and frequent drug testing.97
B.

Burden of Proof

There are generally three standards of proof that triers of fact apply to
reach decisions in court proceedings. The highest standard of proof is
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”98 This standard requires that the judge or jury,
as the trier of fact, be convinced of his or her decision without any
reservations that would be expected of a reasonable person and is largely
reserved for criminal cases.99 The lowest standard of proof ordinarily
applied in court is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, requiring
only that the trier of fact believe a particular outcome is more likely than
another.100 The “preponderance of the evidence” standard ordinarily applies
in civil lawsuits and probable cause determinations in the criminal context.101
The third standard of proof allows decisions to be made based on “clear and
convincing evidence,” which is a higher standard than preponderance of
evidence but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.102 The latter standard
can be found both in criminal proceedings and civil proceedings in certain
circumstances.
In 1978, the Supreme Court considered which standard of proof is
required to involuntarily commit a psychiatric patient in Addington v.
Texas.103 Frank Addington had been hospitalized several times for his
mental illness, and his mother requested his indefinite commitment due to a
prior assault.104 Her request was granted based on a standard of clear and
convincing evidence.105 Addington appealed the decision, arguing that the
correct standard of proof should have been beyond a reasonable doubt.106
However, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding
that because of the “uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis” the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt was an “unreasonable barrier to needed medical
treatment” for many patients who were in clear need of care.107 An obvious
96. Jacob Kurlander, Pro/Con: Outpatient Commitment for the Severely Mentally Ill, AMA
JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Oct. 2003), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/procon-outpatientcommitment-severely-mentally-ill/2003-10.
97. Id.
98. Testa & West, supra note 6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 442; Testa & West, supra note 6.
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criticism of the decision is that if the need for care was indeed so “clear,”
then why would the government fail to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt?
C.

Uncertainty in Confinement

The Precogs are never wrong. But, occasionally . . . they do
disagree.
– Dr. Iris Hineman, Minority Report108
In 1972, David Rosenhan, a psychologist at Stanford University, used
ten psychologically normal individuals as confederates in a research study
and sent them to twelve hospitals across the country.109 These individuals
gave the hospitals false names and occupations and claimed to hear voices.110
The individuals were truthful about all other details, and none of them had
any significant history of mental illness.111 All of the individuals were
admitted to psychiatric units, at which point they stopped reporting
psychiatric symptoms entirely, as instructed.112 Regardless, nearly every
person in the study was diagnosed with schizophrenia.113 Their involuntary
hospitalizations ranged from seven to fifty-two days, with doctors
prescribing them more than 2,000 pills combined, including antipsychotics
and antidepressants.114
While institutionalized, staff commonly
misinterpreted the patients’ behaviors to fit within the context of psychiatric
disorders and behaviors.115 For instance, the patients often took notes while
studying the psychiatric wards, and one nurse wrote in the chart, “[p]atient
engages in writing behavior.”116 Rosenhan’s conclusions were striking:
individuals faking mental illness all gained admission to psychiatric wards,
and after they stopped faking symptoms, they remained institutionalized for
prolonged periods.117 After the study’s completion, Rosenhan stated that it
“is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric
hospitals.”118
Such studies are difficult, if not dangerous, to repeat due to the
unnecessary medications prescribed to the subjects and the uncertainty
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
Morris, supra note 19; Rosenhan, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morris, supra note 19; Rosenhaun, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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relating to the duration of confinement, but real-world examples sometimes
help supplement the findings. More than twenty years after Rosenhan’s
experiment, John Montin walked up to a person’s home and announced that
it “belonged to his ancestors” and that he was “taking it back.”119 Authorities
charged Montin with False Imprisonment.120 A jury found Montin not guilty
because of temporary insanity, and the state transported him to Lincoln
Regional Center, a mental health facility in Lincoln, Nebraska.121 Doctors
at the Lincoln Regional Center never tested Montin themselves; instead they
used police records to dismiss him as delusional rather than court reports
showing otherwise.122 Twenty years after Montin was admitted to the mental
health facility, a psychiatrist at the facility determined that Montin had been
taking medication for back pain in 1993 that caused temporary psychosis.123
The man stopped taking the medication prior to his not guilty verdict twenty
years earlier, but he was only released in 2013, after spending two decades
in the mental facility.124 Montin filed a lawsuit against Lincoln Regional
Center, stating that his confinement caused him to forego marrying, having
a family, and attending his mother’s funeral, not to mention many of the
other benefits liberty provides.125 Even a conviction for the crimes of which
Nebraska accused Montin probably would not have carried such a harsh
sentence, and accepting a plea offer may have further reduced the loss of
liberty. But, perhaps given the uncertain nature of the commitment, Montin
had reason to suspect he would be released soon given the temporary nature
of his insanity.126
More recently, in 2007, Ketema Ross kicked in his elderly neighbors’
door, beat them with a broom handle, and immediately called police
afterward to confess.127 Police arrested Ross and charged him with firstdegree burglary, second-degree assault, third-degree assault and third-degree
unlawful imprisonment.128 Based on a plea offer Ross received, he would
have spent three years in prison.129 However, Ross’ crime manifested from
a mental illness—he believed the attack was necessary at the order of the
President and the Central Intelligence Agency to stop a terrorist attack.
Evidence showed that Ross committed the attack despite the fact that he did

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Distant, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Distant, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Ross, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
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not want to harm his neighbors.130 The jury found Ross not guilty of the
charges by reason of insanity, and instead of locking him in prison for three
years, the state locked in a mental institution for seven years.131 Once
committed to a psychiatric hospital in Washington, Ross was diagnosed with
chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and after taking the prescribed medicine to
treat the symptoms of psychosis, Ross recovered sufficiently to satisfy the
staff approximately 84 months after his confinement.132 This lengthy
commitment was despite the fact that just two years into his confinement,
Ross no longer experienced psychosis.133 Despite his progress, hospital staff
required him to remain in the hospital for an additional five years after his
symptoms subsided.134
Uncertain and prolonged commitment periods are troubling given the
number of individuals currently facing the prospect of involuntary
commitment due to mental health problems. According to a 2017 study
conducted by the National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors, more than 10,000 Americans with mental illness who have not
been convicted of a crime—individuals who have been found not guilty by
reason of insanity or who have been arrested but deemed incompetent to
stand trial—are involuntary committed to psychiatric hospitals.135 When a
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense does succeed, it tends to resemble
a conviction more than an acquittal—the acquitted individuals often endure
longer periods of confinement, as they are pulled into a broken mental health
system that can be more difficult to leave than prison.136 In nearly all states,
there is no limit on commitment duration.137 In the states with limitations,
such as California, the limitations are based on the maximum prison sentence
for the offense, but California’s law permits repeated two-year extensions as

130. Id.
131. Ross, supra note 19.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. McClelland, supra note 9.
136. Id.; Thea Amidov, Mentally Ill and Locked Up: Prisons Versus Inpatient Wards for
Psychiatric Patients, PSCYH CENTRAL (Mar. 30, 2015), https://pro.psychcentral.com/mentally-illand-locked-up-prisons-versus-inpatient-wards-for-psychiatric-patients/. We should note that the
not guilty by reason of insanity defense is not even available as separate from simply disputing the
existence of mens rea in some jurisdictions, something the Supreme Court of the United States
recently ruled conforms with the United States Constitution. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court says
states can limit the scope of insanity defense, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2020/03/23/insanity-defense-supreme-court-lets-states-make-harder-prov
e/2898915001/?fbclid=IwAR0CvCXHZQYbu5V08_-M3Q5Pv2J0ZsXYJLpswtS8Kb0ncS67o64
YdXFk2xg (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135, slip op. (Mar. 23, 2020).
137. McClelland, supra note 9.
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patients approach the limit set on their confinement, effectively permitting
confinement to be extended indefinitely.138
In 1983, a national study revealed that those pleading not guilty by
reason of insanity were often confined for twice as long as those actually
convicted of the same offense.139 “Scant research, conducted decades ago,
seems to constitute the most recent survey of the fate of the country’s [notguilty-by-reason-of-insanity] commitments.”140 Not much is known about
the confinement of persons committed to psychiatric hospitals by the
criminal justice system—no federal agency is charged with collecting data
on not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity patients’ lengths of commitment,
crimes, or treatment, or otherwise monitoring these patients.141 There is no
national registry or other watchdog organization that tracks how mentally
infirm individuals have been involuntarily committed or why.142
In 2015, Florida had 24 patients who were deemed not guilty by reason
of insanity and were hospitalized for more than 15 years, and Texas had 27
such patients.143 Connecticut had 40, Georgia had 43, and New York and
Washington each had 60 not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity patients
committed for longer than 15 years.144 In each of those states—which
exclude thousands of patients that were deemed not guilty by reason of
insanity—a “significant portion of [not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity]
patients had been hospitalized for more than two years. Nearly 1,000 patients
had been hospitalized for five to 15 years.”145 Even more alarming, “[m]ore
than 400 [patients] had been in for longer than 15 [years]. Of these, more
than 100 [patients] had been in longer than 25 years and at least 60 [patients]
for more than 30 [years].”146
When a hospital desires to release or transfer a patient that has pled not
guilty by reason of insanity, the prosecutor’s office can demand a hearing.147
In contesting transfer or release, the prosecutor’s office can compel the
patient to be examined by a doctor the office selects.148 Even if that doctor
agrees that the patient should be released, the prosecutor can still contest the
138. Id.
139. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and
Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (1999), https://
link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023/A:1022364700424.pdf.
140. McClelland, supra note 9.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. McClelland, supra note 9.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Jennifer E. Brockman and John R. Chamberlain, Commitment Following a
Finding of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW ONLINE (2007), 35(2) 268–69, http://jaapl.org/content/35/2/268.
148. McClelland, supra note 9.
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release.149 If a patient does win release or transfer, the prosecutor can
appeal.150 Additionally, in several states, such as New York, a patient that
has pled not guilty by reason of insanity is almost always transferred to a
civil, less secure facility for another undetermined amount of time before
release.151 All of these steps create a difficult path to freedom for many
patients.152 In the majority of states, the courts have final review over these
releases and transfers, and judges commonly side with the prosecution
regardless of what doctors advise.153
For example, Cas Shearin, the Director of Investigations and
Monitoring at Disability Rights North Carolina, recalled a 1988 case where,
during an alcohol-related psychiatric meltdown, a man shot four strangers he
thought were demons.154 Year after year, the man’s treating doctors told the
judge that he was ready to be released.155 The psychiatric hospital increased
his leave privileges, and he was permitted to report to a full-time job and
visit a girlfriend with whom he had children.156 Finally, after 21 years of
commitment and seven psychologists and psychiatrists testifying he no
longer suffered from a mental illness, the hospital released him, and the judge
ordered him to submit to random drug tests for one year.157
According to the former New York State Office of Mental Health
Forensic Director, Joel Dvoskin, politics can determine whether an
individual will be confined for a significant amount of time, regardless of
whether it is safe to release the person.158 “Elected judges, fearing bad
publicity, may be loath to release an offender into the community.”159 For
example, a psychiatric hospital released John Hickley, Jr. 35 years after
being found not guilty by reason of insanity: 20 years after Hickley’s doctors
declared his mental illness to be in full remission.160 According to Dvoskin,
the question “becomes one of risk tolerance. America has become—to an
extreme level that’s almost impossible to exaggerate—a risk-intolerant
society.”161 People fear mental illness, even though only approximately 3%–
5% percent of violent crimes in the United States are attributed to serious
149. Id.
150. McClelland, supra note 9.
151. Id.
152. Id.; What Happens to The Criminally Insane, After Court, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/28/142859813/what-happens-to-the-criminally-insa
ne-after-court.
153. McClelland, supra note 9.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. McClelland, supra note 9.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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mental illness.162 Additionally, those with mental illness may actually be
less likely to commit serious violent acts than the general population.163
Some individuals pleading not guilty by reason of insanity have been
acquitted of nonviolent crimes, such as traffic offenses and prostitution.164
In addition, recidivism rates for individuals who are not guilty by reason
of insanity are relatively low.165 National recidivism rates for released
prisoners are above 60 percent, but individuals “who are found [not guilty
by reason of insanity] tend to go back out into the community, and they tend
to do really, really well.”166 The arrest rate for persons on conditional
release, a mental-health parole from the hospital, is less than half of the arrest
rate of the general population of Maryland.167 Furthermore, a 2016 study of
recidivism rates in Connecticut for those deemed not guilty by reason of
insanity determined that the vast majority of individuals are never
rearrested.168
Psychiatric institutions are the preferred location for housing
individuals who have been deemed “not guilty by reason of insanity,” and
these individuals fill an increasing share of the remaining 42,000 state
psychiatric hospital beds.169 In Pennsylvania, the proportion of patients who
were committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity increased
by 379% between 1988 and 2008.170 In California, nearly 90% of its
approximately 7,000 state hospital patients are those who were deemed not
guilty by reason of insanity.171 Nationwide, approximately one-third of
patients in state hospitals in 2007 were not guilty by reason of insanity
patients, and that number is “rapidly expanding.”172 During the past ten
years, these patients’ medical costs increased from $2.5 billion to $4.25
billion, and these individuals currently account for nearly 44% of total state
psychiatric expenditures.173 In Tennessee, there are not guilty by reason of
insanity patients whom hospitals cannot discharge because they cannot find
162. Mental Health Myths and Facts, MENTALHEALTH.GOV (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.
mentalhealth.gov/basics/mental-health-myths-facts.
163. Mental Illness and Violence, HARVARD MED. SCH. (2011), https://www.health.harvard.
edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence.
164. Linda C. Fentiman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. REV.
601 (1985).
165. Lea Skene, What Happens After Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Plea? Story Behind an
Accused Baton Rouge Cop Shooter, ADVOCATE (Feb. 24, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.theadvocat
e.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_44b13aaa-1279-11e8-b0c0-07b4cb18013e.html.
166. McClelland, supra note 9.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. McClelland, supra note 9.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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an outpatient provider for the individuals.174 According to an employee of
Tennessee’s Mental Health Department, “once you get someone into [a
psychiatric] hospital, it’s hard to get the court to take them back out.”175
Given the uncertainty of confinement, it is entirely possible that in some
cases, a defendant with mental illness may perceive it to be to his or her
benefit to plead guilty (or accept a plea offer) rather than attempting to
establish his or her own insanity.176 This reasonable belief is because the
individual may fear indefinite confinement to a mental health institution as
opposed to a very definite (and sometimes curtailed) sentence he or she
might receive for a crime. This fear and uncertainty might be well-founded,
since in many confinements to mental health treatment facilities on the
grounds of legal insanity, the standards for obtaining release, the
representation of counsel, or both are very unclear.177 Hence, the accused
may elect the evil he or she knows (jail or prison) rather than the evil he or
she does not know (commitment to a mental facility).178
In author Joukov’s practical experience, it was certainly easier for the
government to keep someone involuntarily committed than to prove a
criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt. In his role as a Florida Assistant
State Attorney, Joukov handled several Baker Act hearings. The training of
an attorney for one of these hearings consisted entirely of handing the
attorney a single page of questions to read to a doctor the attorney had never
met before (and never spoke to prior to the hearing) during the hearing.
Joukov attended several hearings and read the questions precisely as they
were written in the order they appeared before a judge, a psychologist,
opposing counsel, and the client seeking to obtain release. Despite the fact
that preparation for these hearings was minimal, and despite the fact that
Joukov received no instructions for what he should do if the direct
174. McClelland, supra note 9.
175. Id.
176. For example, when James was 20 years old, he lured a woman into his house for a
housekeeping interview and subsequently raped her. When charged, James pled “not guilty by
reason of insanity.” He was not sentenced to 20 years, 25 years, or any specific term of
confinement. James was not sentenced at all. His plea did not prescribe or limit the duration of his
stay. Rather, James is required to be hospitalized until he is deemed safe to release to society, no
matter how long that takes. New York committed James to a state psychiatric facility, and
psychologists diagnosed him with borderline-personality disorder. James’ entire “medication”
regimen consists of “fish oil twice a day, calcium, vitamin D and two Kool-Aids and prune juice
and Metamucil.” McClelland, supra note 9.
177. Id.; see also Artem M. Joukov, Isn’t That Hearsay Anyway? How the Federal Hearsay
Rule Can Serve as a Map to the Confrontation Clause, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 337, 380 (2018)
(emphasizing the importance of legal clarity); see generally Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M.
Caspar, Comrades or Foes: Did the Russians Break the Law or New Ground for the First
Amendment?, 39 PACE L. REV. 43, 99 n.326 (2018) (emphasizing the same).
178. Id.; see also Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, Mental Health and the
Constitution: How Incarcerating the Mentally Ill Might Pave the Way to Treatment, 20 NEV. L.J.
547, 569 (2020).
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examination went off track, Joukov never lost a single hearing. He recalls
that most hearings proceeded without any cross-examination, there were
never any objections, and the hearings lasted no longer than fifteen minutes
(including the time it took for the judge to issue a ruling). Joukov is unaware
of a single appeal filed from one of these hearings, nor could there be an
appeal in most instances since none of the issues would have been properly
preserved without objection. These proceedings were very different from an
adversarial jury trial, which is at least afforded to every Florida individual
accused of a high crime or misdemeanor and which often incorporates
objections, cross-examination, and even appeals. The Article leaves it to the
readers to decide for themselves whether this Baker Act procedure and
similar procedures in other states fully and properly protect the constitutional
rights of the individual seeking release.179

Part III: Constitutionality
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in Jones v. United States that it was
not a due process violation to commit not guilty by reason of insanity
defendants automatically and indefinitely to a mental hospital.180 In Jones,
Michael Jones, a paranoid schizophrenic, had been committed to a mental
hospital since 1975 for eight years after pleading not guilty by reason of
insanity to petty larceny for attempting to steal a jacket, a misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year.181 The Superior
Court of the District of Columbia found Jones not guilty by reason of
insanity, committing him to a mental hospital.182 At Jones’ subsequent 50day hearing, the court found that he suffered from a mental illness and
determined that he was considered a danger to himself or others.183 The
Court held a second release hearing after Jones had been hospitalized for
more than one year—the maximum period he could have spent in prison had
he been convicted.184
Jones demanded that he be released, and the Superior Court denied his
release, continuing his commitment, a ruling ultimately affirmed by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court.185 According to the Supreme Court, when a criminal defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime
179. See, e.g., Mental Health Commitment Laws: A Survey of the States, TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CENTER (2014), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/2014state-survey-abridged.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
180. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
181. Id. at 359.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 360.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 354, 370; Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183, 1978 D.C. App. LEXIS 585.
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by reason of insanity, the United States Constitution permits the government,
on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental hospital
“until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to
himself or society.”186 Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here
simply is no necessary correlation between the length of the acquittee’s
hypothetical criminal sentence and the length of time necessary for his
recovery.”187
This decision appeared to deviate from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.188 For example, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme
Court held that non-dangerous individuals could not be confined against
their will at all.189 However, the Jones decision seemed to run contrary to
O’Connor’s reasoning despite the fact that committing a crime is not an
inherently dangerous act.190 Examples of non-dangerous crimes include
small-time theft, the recreational use of mild drugs (such as cannabis), and
trespass that does not involve danger or threat of danger to the trespasser or
others.191 These crimes, while constituting a nuisance, surely do not suggest
a dangerous perpetrator in the vast majority of instances.192 According to
Jones, however, if someone accused of trespass invokes the insanity
defense,193 the individual could be confined indefinitely until he or she
overcomes his or her illness.194
Although the Supreme Court later clarified Jones in Foucha v.
Louisiana, the potential chilling effect on insanity defenses was not
necessarily an abdicated possibility.195 In Foucha, the Supreme Court held
that potential future danger was insufficient cause, on its own, to keep a
person committed after a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict.196
Theoretically, this would reduce the chance of a person remaining in
commitment beyond the necessary time.197 Practically, though, even
Supreme Court rulings such as this one reach only as far as individuals are
186. Jones, 463 U.S. at 354.
187. Id. at 369.
188. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
189. Id.
190. Jones, 463 U.S. at 354.
191. Chris Christie, Save Jail for the Dangerous, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/save-jail-dangerous.
192. Id.
193. The chances of such a defense being invoked on this charge are incredibly low, despite
the fact that many individuals who commit petty crimes like trespass may be suffering from some
type of mental illness. However, that may be because of the consequences Jones entails for
individuals so accused: They may correctly infer that it is better to spend a day in jail and go free
than to remain in a mental health institution indefinitely after a trial. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 354.
194. Id. at 369.
195. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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willing to enforce them. Therefore, if the ultimate decision is left to the
exclusive discretion of a doctor or a judge, society must rely solely on this
individual to adequately protect the freedoms of persons with mental illness.
As demonstrated earlier, this reliance can be somewhat misplaced.
However, Foucha did not prevent the Supreme Court from adding
additional post-Jones hurdles to the commitment of individuals with mental
illness.198 Even when confronted with an individual previously convicted of
sex offenses, the Supreme Court tread very lightly when discussing the
possibility of civil commitment to prevent future harm.199 Particularly, the
Court held that even though the individual in question had more than one
conviction for sexual crimes, the State of Kansas could not civilly commit
him after he completed the punitive measures of the criminal charges without
proof that the offender had “serious difficulty” in controlling his behavior.200
The Court clarified that this would require more than mere proof of potential
for recidivism.201 Rather, any state that sought such a commitment would
have to prove that a psychological condition made the individual more
dangerous than a “dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case.”202 This ruling put civil commitment in line with general
concepts of criminal law: that individuals may not lose their liberty on the
basis of crimes that they have yet to commit (regardless of the likelihood that
the defendant would commit such crimes).
However, the Supreme Court has only been somewhat stringent with
the potential use of civil commitment as an alternative to criminal
punishment in instances where the government cannot prove sufficient
criminal conduct to induce prolonged incarceration but hopes to confine an
individual anyway.203 Particularly, the Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between civil commitment and criminal confinement that
deprives individuals with mental illness of the protections available to
criminals.204 For example, while Crane prevailed in Kansas v. Crane, Seling
v. Young showed that bringing a challenge on similar constitutional grounds
would not necessarily lead to the same result.205 Just like Crane, Young
objected to his civil commitment after the conclusion of his punitive term for
several sexual offenses (“six rapes over three decades”).206 However, his
objections were not on due process grounds but rather based on the double

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 407–13.
Id. at 413.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413; Seling, 531 U.S. at 250.
Seling, 531 U.S. at 250.
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jeopardy clause and the ex post facto law provision of the United States
Constitution.207
The Supreme Court quickly dismissed these challenges.208 The
Majority’s analysis went no further than merely stressing that civil
commitment and criminal punishment were fundamentally different, which
prevented constitutional protections that the United States Constitution
afforded to people accused or convicted of crimes from applying to
individuals struggling with mental health problems.209 This distinction
between criminal and civil commitment, however, might prove illusory in
light of the actual challenges faced by those committed. Evidence shows
that committing an individual to involuntary confinement is not significantly
different from a term of imprisonment, except that confinement has far fewer
limitations and can actually last longer, if not indefinitely.210 Therefore, the
distinction that the Supreme Court has continuously drawn should not be a
sufficient justification for failing to reexamine involuntary commitment laws
both in terms of their substance and their procedure.
The Supreme Court has certainly used the distinction between
punishment and other government purposes to nullify arguments about
constitutional rights violations.211 This distinction leads to a seemingly
paradoxical outcome: once an individual is no longer in the realm of criminal
law, his or her rights against detention tend to decrease. But this creates a
significant and likely unintended discontinuity in the rights a person has in
various instances. First, the Founding Fathers, who were trying to shape
American government for centuries to come in a relatively short document,
may not have foreseen the myriad of potential applications of the United
States Constitution. It is entirely possible that they intended the Bill of
Rights to protect people generally, not to address every conceivable instance
of potential government overreach—an overreach that could be addressed by
democratic process by the states. Second, by treating criminal confinement
and civil confinement separately due to the original government purpose:
prevention versus punishment,212 the Supreme Court allows reality to take a
back seat.213 To the citizen confined or incarcerated, the government purpose
207. Seling, 531 U.S. at 250; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
208. Seling, 531 U.S. at 250.
209. Id.
210. Guy Hamilton-Smith, The Endless Punishment of Civil Commitment, THE APPEAL (Sept.
4, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-endless-punishment-of-civil-commitment/; McClelland, supra
note 9.
211. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (applying Eighth Amendment standards to jails, but
holding that in the context of pre-trial detention, confinement to jail did not constitute punishment);
Seling, 531 U.S. at 250.
212. Or the origin of the proceedings launched by the state as beginning in the realm of civil
commitment as opposed to a criminal charge.
213. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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for confinement is less relevant than the general loss of freedom
altogether.214 Hence, the concern with drawing a distinction between civil
and criminal confinement ignores the interests of the person most impacted
by the government action.
It is important to note that actual loss of freedom triggers additional
protections in the criminal world.215 The federal right of indigent defendants
to be represented by court-appointed counsel applies only if the proceedings
carry a possibility of incarceration.216 The federal right to receive a jury trial
only attaches when the possible length of incarceration exceeds six
months.217 Yet limiting all of these rights to criminally implicated
individuals while refusing to extend them to individuals who may not have
even committed a crime seems obviously unjust. The reason the United
States Constitution draws such a distinction may be because the Founding
Fathers may not have contemplated high rates of civil commitments on
grounds of mental illness in a time when psychology and mental illness were
not well-understood.218 However, for such a distinction to continue into the
twenty-first century would constitute a willful disregard for the problems
individuals with mental illness face.219
State and federal legislatures can certainly address this problem without
court involvement by promulgating statutes that extend criminal rights to
individuals with mental illness facing prolonged commitment. States may
even go further, seeking to amend their respective constitutions to reflect
these rights. In fact, the states or the federal legislature may even attempt to
amend the United States Constitution, though such an amendment may prove
particularly unlikely in such a divided time in our nation’s history.220
However, it may be that a fair look at criminal rights and an extending
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would cure the problem within
the courts, even if state and federal legislatures offer no solution.
The Supreme Court could view the current refusal to extend the rights
enjoyed by criminal defendants to persons with mental illness as a violation

214. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 213.
215. Criminal Rights: Laws and Protections, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEGREE SCHOOLS,
https://www.criminaljusticedegreeschools.com/criminal-justice-resources/criminal-rights-lawsand-protections/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
216. The Right to a Public Defender, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/ procedure/
miranda-rights/right-to-public-defender/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
217. The Right to a Jury Trial, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-rights/theright-to-a-jury-trial.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
218. See History of Psychology (387 BC to Present), ALLPSYCH, https://allpsych.com/time
line/; see also Timeline: The Development of Psychology, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2009, 7:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/ 2009/mar/07/timeline-psychology-history.
219. Kaufman, supra note 15.
220. The Amendment Process, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, https://www.tru
manlibrary.gov/education/three-branches/amendment-process (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
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of equal protection principles.221 Surely, if a state extends certain rights to
individuals that committed a crime, it must extend these rights to innocent or
potentially innocent individuals facing a similar predicament.222 While
significant differences may exist between those accused of crimes and those
facing civil commitment, these differences diminish when it comes to their
shared interest in their liberty, the ability to receive due process in the
determination of confinement, and many other traits that relate to the actual
government proceedings that deprive individuals of liberty and property.
Admittedly, equal protection principles have “bite” only when similarly
situated individuals receive differential treatment.223 However, even if some
individuals with mental illness are too different from individuals accused of
crimes for purposes of government detention, they are often more
sympathetic from a legal perspective. This should ensure that they receive
greater protections rather than lesser ones. Even if this entitlement to
protection is insufficient to strike the differential treatment on its face, it is
possible that as applied challenges in particular cases might be more
successful. This likelihood should be particularly true when coupled with
due process analysis, which the Supreme Court has previously used instead
of equal protection and Eighth Amendment principles to protect the rights of
persons with mental illness.224
Furthermore, this may be applicable well beyond state statutes and
constitutional provisions because the Fourteenth Amendment, and its reverse
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
fundamentally changed the applicability of constitutional protections in the
Bill of Rights.225 For example, prior to the passage of the Due Process Clause
that allowed the application of rights against the federal government against
state government, criminal defendants would not have enjoyed the same
rights that they enjoy today.226 Perhaps an argument can be made that
221. Equal protection provides: “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
222. Alan Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 7–30 (1982).
223. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
224. Mental Health Rights, MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA (2019), https://www.mhanational.org/
issues/mental-health-rights (last visited Feb 12, 2019); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001);
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013).
226. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (mentioning in dicta that Fourth
Amendment rights restrict state agents as well as federal ones); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)

A - CASPAR_ JOUVOK_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

526

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

4/6/2020 10:11 AM

[Vol. 47:4

excluding individuals with mental illness facing civil commitment from
constitutional protections afforded to a criminal suspect violates equal
protection principles.
For example, the Sixth Amendment’s preservation of the right to an
impartial jury trial “[i]n criminal prosecutions”227 could violate equal
protection if it did not also apply to individuals facing civil commitment.
After all, the Sixth Amendment treats individuals accused of crimes that face
incarceration and individuals with mental illness facing commitment
differently despite similar predicaments (and perhaps a common cause for
the conduct leading up to the confinement).228 Since the Fourteenth
Amendment was passed after the Sixth Amendment, it could technically
overcome its limiting language regarding those who are entitled to a jury
trial.229 The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in part to ensure that the
freedoms available to all Americans would be available to recently-freed
slaves.230 Since then, the Fourteenth Amendment has been extended many
times by court rulings to protect classes outside of recently-freed slaves.231
Perhaps its Equal Protection Clause could apply amendments previously
unintended to protect persons with mental illness, to include individuals
struggling with mental illness when they face loss of liberty. This scenario
would not be the first time the Supreme Court extended criminal rights to
individuals involved in quasi-criminal proceedings, even if those
proceedings did not carry the possibility of incarceration.232

(incorporating the right against Double Jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a jury trial to apply to the states); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the right to a speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the right to a public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(incorporating the right to confront opposing witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (incorporating the right to assistance of counsel in capital
cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(incorporating the right against cruel and unusual punishment); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682
(2019).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
228. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 9.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
230. 14th Amendment, HISTORY (2018), https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/fourtee
nth-amendment.
231. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108; Ker, 374 U.S. at
23; Benton, 395 U.S. at 784; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609; Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1; Miranda, 348 U.S. at
436; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145; Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 213; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 257; Pointer, 380
U.S. at 400; Washington, 388 U.S. at 14; Powell, 287 U.S. at 45; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335;
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25; Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660; Timbs, 586 U.S.
at 682.
232. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (acknowledging the quasi-criminal
nature of a character and fitness inquiry regarding the character and fitness of a bar applicant and
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Of course, such a ruling would turn quite a bit of jurisprudence on its
head, which makes its occurrence unlikely. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires balancing before invalidating prior laws or constitutional
provisions.233 Generally, if the government can demonstrate a rational basis
for its acts, then the discrimination is permissible.234 The rational basis
standard is not a terribly high standard, even though the Majority in United
States v. Windsor appeared to greatly increase the bite of rational basis
review.235 However, the distinctions contained within the Bill of Rights,
such as the right to a jury trial for individuals facing criminal prosecutions
(but not civil commitment) likely pass this test with ease.236 In fact, if the
mere argument that individuals accused of crimes receive a particular
protection unavailable to the innocent was to be applied to the world of civil
trials, a significant number of criminal protections would have to be
immediately extended. These protections would include the right to confront
the witnesses against the accused,237 the right against Double Jeopardy,238
the right against Cruel and Unusual Punishment (as well as excessive
fines),239 and so on.
The answer to this potential problem is that there is a significant
similarity between commitment due to mental illness and criminal
confinement that is absent when it comes to comparing other civil
proceedings to criminal ones.240 In the past, the existence of such similarities
has been used to justify extending traditionally criminal protections to the
civil world.241 The right to legal representation at state cost was ordinarily
reserved to criminal proceedings, but when the outcome involved truly high
stakes, comparable to criminal sanctions, counsel could be provided.242 One
example is the requirement to provide counsel in civil proceedings that may
affording the bar applicant some of the rights afforded to individuals facing criminal accusations);
see Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of the State of N.M., 252 U.S. 232 (1957).
233. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
234. Id.
235. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Artem M. Joukov, A Second Opinion:
Can Windsor v. United States Survive President Trump’s Supreme Court?, 27 J.L. & POL”Y 327
(2019).
236. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 502.
237. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
238. U.S. CONST. amend V.
239. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
240. Ed Lyon, Civil Commitment Used to Imprison Drug Users in Massachusetts, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS (July 2, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jul/2/civil-commitmentused-imprison-drug-users-massachusetts/; Donald Stone, There are Cracks in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recommendations to Patch the System, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 789 (2016).
241. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); see also Schware v. Bd.
of Bar Examiners of the State of N.M., 252 U.S. 232 (1957); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 542
U.S. 18 (1981).
242. Lassiter, 542 U.S. at 18; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
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lead to confinement due to a holding of civil contempt.243 This requirement
constitutes important precedent, since civil contempt, much like
commitment to a mental health treatment facility, could be indefinite.244
Another example is the required provision of counsel when sufficiently
complex civil proceedings commence to fully terminate parental rights.245
Presumably, because the loss of parental rights is so significant that many
would prefer a wide array of criminal sanctions to this outcome, the
protections afforded to the criminally accused become extended to the
defendant in this type of complex civil proceeding (albeit under due process
principles rather than equal protection principles, though these are not
altogether separable).246
These similarities should open the door to the argument that civil
commitment for mental health reasons, due to its prolonged and indefinite
nature, inherently includes greater loss of liberty and potential suffering than
a definite criminal sentence.247 Hence, if individuals accused of crimes
receive the protections of a jury trial and a heightened burden of proof,248 so
should individuals whose only “crime” might be that they are sufficiently
unfortunate to be stricken with mental illnesses. This would, of course, entail
protections similar to representation by counsel, which many states already
provide even without a Supreme Court ruling to that effect.249
It is true that the Supreme Court could also use the Due Process Clause
to achieve this outcome.250 This process would certainly be consistent with
its precedent that extends other rights to persons with mental illness and to
individuals facing legal deprivations akin to criminal sanctions.251 However,
the analysis, ultimately, is a comparative one, which might make the Equal
Protection Clause (and its implicit reverse-incorporation in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment) a potentially more appropriate instrument

243. Turner, 564 U.S. at 431.
244. In Alabama, for example, “[t]he sanction for civil contempt continues indefinitely until
the contemnor performs as ordered. A critical distinction is that the sanction for criminal contempt
is limited in Alabama district and circuit courts to a maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not
to exceed five days.” State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1072 (Ala. 1989) (emphasis added).
245. Lassiter, 542 U.S. at 18 (The court stated that Lassiter would not be entitled to appointed
counsel in the proceeding at hand, but in situations where the case was particularly complex, the
individual facing the termination of parental rights would be entitled to counsel.).
246. Id. The Due Process Clause has an equal protection component. United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
247. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see, e.g., McClelland, supra note 9.
248. Criminal Rights: Laws and Protections, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEGREE SCHOOLS, https://
www.criminaljusticedegreeschools.com/criminal-justice-resources/criminal-rights-laws-and-pro
tections/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
249. Stone, supra note 240.
250. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
251. Meisel, supra note 222.
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in the Supreme Court’s toolbox.252 What is most important, though, is that
the Supreme Court set aside its distinction between individuals accused of
criminal conduct and individuals facing almost identical predicaments in the
civil context.253 These distinctions prevent the application of the Eighth
Amendment, as well as other constitutional protections, to individuals that,
from a practical perspective, should be entitled to them.254
If constitutional rights were designed to protect Americans from actual
infringements by the government rather than theoretical ones, then
distinctions like this do not help.255 The individual impacted by government
action rarely cares about his or her theoretical predicament but concerns
himself or herself with the practical one.256 Of course, an important textual
argument is that the United States Constitution should be applied as written,
not as society would want it to be written, to exclude government intrusions
society dislikes.257 If the intrusion is so inconsistent with Americans’
perception of their rights, then the option of amending the United States
Constitution always exists, and the lack of such an amendment signifies a
refusal to grant the courts authority to extend certain rights to certain
individuals.258
These arguments may be consistent in many ways, but they should
consider the Fourteenth Amendment, likely one of the most influential
amendments in constitutional law.259
The text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and its passage after other amendments, should lead its
interpretation to be that of modifying the language of prior amendments to
potentially include within their protections those who were previously
excluded.260 If that is the case, then the question of who those older
amendments apply to under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause principles is non-trivial.261 A case involving the adversity faced by
individuals with mental health problems might give the Supreme Court an
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013).
253. Stone, supra note 240.
254. Id.; Holmes, supra note 213.
255. Id.
256. Holmes, supra note 213 (discussing an approach to the law from the perspective of the
“bad man, who cares only for the material consequences that such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reason for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of
it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
257. The Originalist Perspective, HERITAGE, https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/intro
essays/3/the-originalist-perspective (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
258. Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES (2016), https://www.archives.
gov/federal-register/constitution; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
259. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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important opportunity to face this question once again. This Article
advocates that the Supreme Court approach this question by raising the
standard of proof required for involuntary civil commitment, requiring
definite lengths of commitment to be determined, and imposing the
requirement that a jury reach the commitment determination if the defendant
invokes the right to a jury trial.
Finally, it is necessary to return at least once more to the Supreme
Court’s currently well-established distinction between detention and
punishment.262
This distinction, largely created to prevent Eighth
Amendment challenges to pre-trial detention, is problematic in several ways.
On the one hand, it is a crucial distinction, since equating pretrial detention
to punishment would imply that an individual held in state custody prior to
trial has already been punished despite the presumption of innocence and
potential future acquittal.263 On the other hand, pretrial detention and postconviction imprisonment are not very different. In some instances, the
convicted individual would be merely sent back to the same jail to serve his
or her sentence where he or she previously remained in anticipation of trial.
Furthermore, time spent in jail prior to trial is often (if not always) credited
as time served, reducing the sentence to be served post trial or plea by the
amount of time spent in jail in anticipation of disposition.264 Hence, while
the legal definitional distinction between pretrial and post-trial detention as
punishment might be required to prevent the legal concept of pre-conviction
punishment, the practical and legal application outside of this context proves
dubious.265
At the intersection of mental health and the law, the Eighth Amendment
can play two important roles. If applied to civil detentions due to their
similarities to punishment (through equal protection principles or on its
face), the Eighth Amendment can prevent indefinite or practically indefinite
commitments of individuals who have not, through their criminal acts,
justified such commitments. Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment could be
used to eliminate the “prosecution” of individuals with mental illness. Just
as the Supreme Court once held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to
criminally punish drug addiction (an important type of mental illness),266 the
Court can extend this holding to using a civil commitment process to
essentially prosecute persons with mental illness, generally.
262. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
263. See id.; Stone, supra note 240; Richard M. Aborn & Ashley D. Cannon, Prisons: In Jail,
But Not Sentenced, AMERICAS QUARTERLY (2013), https://www.americasquarterly.org/abornprisons.
264. Adam L. Banter, II, Correction of Jail Credit After Sentencing, VALRICO LAW GROUP
(2017), https://tampacrimeattorneys.com/correction-of-jail-credit-after-sentencing/.
265. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 520; Holmes, supra note 213.
266. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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Conclusion
Overall, government leeway to commit individuals on suspicions of
mental health problems should arouse suspicion and a significant amount of
scrutiny. Psychologists are likely improving their ability to diagnose
individuals with mental health problems, but the diagnoses are not nearly as
clear-cut as a physician diagnosing a broken arm.267 Hence, while diagnoses
made with a fair amount of confidence might be sufficient to limit certain
rights and privileges, that should not apply to fundamental rights such as the
right to liberty. Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court has been fairly clear
that holding harmless individuals with mental illness against their will is
impermissible,268 the reality is that this ruling has been all too difficult to
enforce. Hence, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court expand its
jurisprudence on the subject to further address the problems at hand.269
One suggestion involves raising the standard of proof and requiring jury
determinations in favor of commitment before they occur. The heightened
standard of proof would bring mental health commitment determination to
the level of criminal trials, which is appropriate given similar, if not
significantly greater, impositions upon individuals with mental illness in the
event of an adverse ruling.270 The heightened standard may lead decisionmakers to be more careful in applying the law to the facts and might ensure
that, first and foremost, constitutional liberties are protected.
The additional jury requirement may also be helpful for several reasons.
For one, it would raise the effort required by the state to achieve its goal of
commitment. Jury trials are often far more formal than bench trials, ensuring
adherence to the Rules of Evidence and other procedural standards that might
otherwise be loosened in the presence of only a judge.271 Furthermore, the
expense of jury trials alone would ensure that state and federal authorities
act to commit a person only when it is truly necessary.272 Perhaps most
importantly, though, a public jury trial would allow a significant amount of
public scrutiny of the process. This scrutiny may permit individuals to
escape unwanted commitment and prevent the nightmare scenario of a
person being committed in a sham hearing by a judge and “expert” who have

267. Tanya J. Peterson, Why Can Mental Illness Be So Hard to Diagnose?, HEALTHY PLACE
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.healthyplace.com/other-info/mental-health-newsletter/why-canmental-illness-be-so-hard-to-diagnose.
268. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
269. We also suggest that state supreme courts or legislatures voluntarily modify their
standards to ensure the protections of individuals struggling with mental illness.
270. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 9.
271. See, e.g., Bench Trials vs. Jury Trials: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Both,
BRETT A. PODOLSY (Aug. 23, 2017), https://brettpodolsky.com/jury/jury-vs-bench-trials-the-adva
ntages-and-disadvantages-of-both.
272. Id.
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made up their mind before the hearing begins. It is unlikely that jurors,
mostly inexperienced with the system and perhaps sympathizing somewhat
with the individual, would permit commitments on scant evidence of future
danger.
Finally, we propose rules that limit the involuntary commitment of
persons with mental illness to a definite timeframe. Courts, statutes, or both
should require that commitments have a definite end date and perhaps that
this end date should not extend beyond the time an individual might be
incarcerated for similar conduct. Without this requirement, individuals
found not guilty by reason of insanity would actually face greater sanctions
than if they had pleaded guilty, which is a perverse outcome that should be
discouraged. An individual should lose no more liberty due to a finding of
mental instability than he or she might upon an outright conviction resulting
from culpable criminal conduct.
Whether the procedural changes suggested in this Article come by way
of constitutional mandate or by statute, they must come soon. The danger of
depriving individuals needlessly through an essentially non-adversarial
process away from the eyes of the public is high, particularly when
individuals committed against their will might be perceived to lack
credibility or the power to fight back. Because mental health commitments
can result in the same or greater liberty and property deprivation than
criminal incarceration, the constitutional and procedural scrutiny should be
no less severe. Given psychologists’ rate of error in diagnoses demonstrated
by studies of the commitment of perfectly sane people, heightened standards
should be expeditiously implemented. In a country seeking to be defined for
its commitment to liberty, perhaps we should err on the side of liberty when
in doubt. Extending this principle to persons with mental illness must result
in reduction of potentially permanent civil commitments due to mere
suspicion of future health and conduct problems.

